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STUDENT NOTES
suit, although some courts, including Kentucky, do allow them if
reputation is involved, or if the sole purpose of the suit is to annoy.
But in most cases where recoveries were allowed for malicious
prosecution in civil suits, the offending party had brought successive
suits upon the same cause of action. Therefore, it is doubtful if de-
fendant's claim for damages for malicious prosecution would have
been allowed even if the termination of the suit could have been
alleged and proved, because of the hesitancy upon the part of all
courts to allow the maintenance of this type of action. In view of this
oft expressed disfavor to this type of action, a court would hardly be
justified in making an exception to the rule regarding termination
of suits simply because of the non-residency of a party and the con-
sequent hardship upon the party sued to later maintain his possible
action for malicious prosecution.
Defendant would have had no cause of action if she had attempted
to bring an independent suit, rather than asserting her purported
claim as a counterclaim, before termination of the present suit. For
this reason the demurrer to the counterclaim should have been sus-
tained. It is well settled that a counterclaim must be a cause of action,
and state all the necessary allegations of such cause of action,8 and
here defendant had no cause of action for malicious prosecution until
the final termination of the present suit. For this reason, if for no
other, plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's counterclaim should have
been sustained by the court.
JAMES M. TEay.
VIOLATION OF A STATUTE IN DETERMINING NEGLIGENCE
In the recent case of Soutlern Mining Company v. Saylor,1 the
plaintiff sued for damages for injuries sustained by film when the
improperly supported ceiling of the mine room in which he was work-
ing fell on him. The plaintiff based his right to recover on the failure
of the defendant mine owners and mine foreman to comply with Ken-
tucky Statutes 2726-4, which imperatively imposed upon the mine
foreman and the assistant mine foreman the duty of examining the
plaintiff's working place not less than two times a week while he was
working, and to see that his working place was properly secured by
props and timbers, and not to direct him to work in an unsafe place
except for the purpose of making it safe; and Kentucky Statutes
2726-7, which states that it shall be the duty of the mine foreman or
the assistant mine foreman of every coal mine in this state to see that
every person employed to work in such mine shall, before beginning
Pierce v. Thompson, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 192 (1828); Kolka v. Jones,
6 N. D. 461, 71 N. W. 558 (1897); Payne v. Donegan, 9 Ill. App. 566
(1881); Shedd v. Patterson, 302 Ill. 355, 134 N. D. 705 (1922).
Kelly v. Kelly, 1 Ky. Opin. 328 (1866); Rice v. Pulliam, 141 Ky.
10, 131 S. W. 1053 (1910); Griffith v. Dowd, 133 Minn. 305, 158 N. W. 420
(1916); Albrecht v, Dillon, 224 Ill. App. 421 (1922); Braden v. Gulf
Coast Lumber Co., 89 Okla. 215, 215 Pac. 202 (1923); J. M. Broat Lum-
ber Co. v. Van Houten, 66 Mont. 478, 213 Pac. 1116 (1923).
378 KENTUcKY LAW JoURNAL
work therein, be instructed in the particular danger incident to his
work in such place2 Held: The failure to notify the plaintiff as to
the particular danger incident to his work, and the failure of the
mine foreman or the assistant mine foreman to visit the working
place of the plaintiff, and to see that the plaintiff's working place was
properly secured by timbers and props, was a violation of the statutes
and was "negligence per se".
The decisions are not in accord as to the violation of a statute
being "negligence per se".3 The majority view is that such does
constitute negligence, for the reason that failure to observe what the
legislature has prescribed as a reasonable precaution is failure to
observe the care which an "ordinary prudent man" would observe.'
The minority rule is that violation of a statute is not "negligence
per se", but is only "evidence of negligence", and, at most, only can
amount to a "prima facie" case of negligence.5 This rule is supported
in part by the States of Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Minnesota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.
Some courts, which apply the rule that the violation of a statute
is "negligence per se", deny the application of the rule in cases of
ordinances and insist that it is solely applicable to laws enacted by
the legislature6 These courts state that the breach of a municipal
ordinance is "evidence of negligence", to be considered with the
other facts of the case. No reasonable or plausible ground can be
found for making such a distinction. When an ordinance is passed
within the proper sphere of municipal legislation, and is not incon-
sistent with or in contravention of general laws, and though local in
its application, there is no reason why it should not be held to impose
a legal duty, such that a civil action for damages might be main-
tained for a breach thereof.'
In the absence of a statute the plaintiff would have to base his
case on negligence, and such would be a proper case for the jury.
SSouthern Mining Company v. Saylor, 264 Ky. 655, 95 W. (2d)
236 (1936).
2 Kentucky Statutes (1930), Sections 2726-4 and 2726-7.
'Twitchell v. McConn, 116 Me. 490, 102 Atl. 740 (1917); Lane
v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136 (1872); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y.
164, 126 N. E. 814 (1920).
'McElhimey v. Knittle, 199 Iowa 778, 201 N. W. 586 (1925);
Coffey v. Slingerland, 9 Cal. A. Rep. 731, 50 P. (2nd) 830 (1936);
Carron v. Guido, 54 Idaho 494, 33 P. (2nd) 345 (1934); Gonchar v.
Kelson, 114 Conn. 262, 158 Atl. 545 (1932); State v. Cope, 204 N. C. 28,
167 S. E. 456 (1933); Propulanus v. Goebel Construction Co., 279 Mo.
358, 213 S. W. 782 (1919); Della Mora v. Favillo, 37 Cal. App. 164,
173 P. 770 (1918).
r Johnson v. American Reduction Co., 305 Pa. 537, 158 Atl. 153
(1931); Renner v. Martin, 16 N. J. Law 240, 183 AtI. 185 (1936);
Conrad v. Springfield Const. Co., 240 Ill. 12, 88 N. E. 180 (1909).
6 Chambers v. Ohio Trust Co., 1 Disney (Ohio) 327 (1857); Knupple
v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N. Y. 488 (1881).
1Davis v. Hopkins, 50 Ga. A. Rep. 654, 179 S. E. 213 (1935);
Hataway v. Strauss, 158 So. 408 (1935).
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The defendant's acts are subjected to the test of the "ordinary
prudent man".8 Courts, under certain conditions and in some cases,
have said that reasonable men could not differ and that certain con-
duct is, as a matter of law, negligent-having fallen below the standard
set. If the courts can say that certain conduct is negligent, then
there is no plausible reason why the legislature can not also say
that certain conduct is as a matter of law negligent. The difficulty
that arises in the cases where the legislature has said that certain
conduct Is below the standard comes from the fact that in some
statutes there is no provision giving an action for civil damages.
It seems that if the statute is passed for the protection of the in-
dividual who is injured, he should have a civil action for damages no
matter whether such provision is placed in the statute or not. The
legislature has spoken and the matter should seem closed to a
difference of opinion.
It is not every violation of a statute or ordinance, of course, that
constitutes negligence, or gives an individual harmed thereby, a
right of action in tort. The plaintiff to come within the protection
of the statute must show: (A) That he is one of the general class
of persons intended to be protected by the prohibition of the un-
reasonable risk involved in the defendant's conduct.' A harm sus-
tained as a result of a defendant's breach of a statutory duty by one
not a member of the general class of persons for whose protection
the statute was enacted, will not support an action based upon the
violation of the statute. (B) That the harm sustained by him is of
the general type of harms which make the defendant's conduct un-
reasonable-the type of injury the statute is designed to prevent.1 '
(C) That the harm happened in such a manner that it would not be
unfair to hold defendant liable therefor, that is, that the damage
was the proximate or legal result of defendant's breach of the
statute.n
It is indeed gratifying to know that the high court of Kentucky
has definitely taken its stand, regarding the violation of a statute in
determining negligence, along with the great majority of the author-
itative courts in the United States, and it is to be hoped that those
few jurisdictions which hold to the "evidence of negligence" theory
'Restatement, Torts, Section 168, Comment (d).
OGibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N. E. 182 (1892); Hamilton
v. Minn. Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N, W. 693 (1899); Zajowski
v. American Steel and Wire Co., 258 F. 9, 6 A. L. R. 348 (1918);
King v. San Diego Electric Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 266, 168 P. 131 (1917);
Ross v. Schooley, 257 F. 290 (1919).
10 Falk v. Finkleman, 268 Mass. 89, 168 N. E. 89 (1929); Denten
v. Mo. K. and T. Railroad Co., 90 Kans. 51, 133 P. 558 (1913); Sheldon
v. Wichita R. and Light Co., 125 Kans. 476, 264 P. 732 (1928); Frank-
lin v. Houston Electric Co., 286 S. W. 578 (1926).
127 Mich. L. Rev. 116 (1928); Hennington v. Markowitz, 230
N. Y. Sup. 313 (1928); Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234
N. W. 372 (1931); Restatement, Torts, Section 305.
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will soon realize their mistake and remedy it at their first oppor-
tunity.
CniunLEs GADD.
TERMINOLOGY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY IN
REGARD TO CERTAIN INTERESTS IN REALTY
The Kentucky court has been rather careless in its use of the
terms "reversion" and "reversionary interest". This is illustrated in
the recent case of Fayette County Board of Education, et al. v. Bryan,
et al." This action instituted under the declaratory judgment act in-
volved the construction of three deeds conveying land to the Board of
Education's predecessor in title for school purposes. The first deed
after making an absolute conveyance by the granting clause provided,
"subject, however to the following trusts and conditions; the said tract
of land shall be used only for school purposes, . . and should
the said land ever be used for any other purpose, the title thereto
shall at once revert to and be vested in the first party, free from any
right or claim of the second party".
The court termed and held the interest of the transferor a vested
reversionary right, which she could convey or release to the holder of
the defeasable or determinable fee.
The second deed was to the trustees or their successors in office
"so long as it is used for a school".
The court said, "This was a specified condition subsequent which
created a determinable or qualified fee subject to termination and
reversion upon cessation of that use". "There was a remnant of an
estate continuing in the grantor which was capable of being trans-
mitted."
The third deed was conveyed to the trustees upon condition that
it be used for school purposes, and if said property ever ceases to be
used for the purpose of a school, "then said lot of land shall revert
to the estate from which it is hereby granted". The court also used
the term "reversion" here in referring to the interest of the grantor.
From the authorities it would appear that the term "reversion"
is not correctly applicable to the interest of the transferor in either
of the above deeds. The correct terminology for the interest of the
transferor in each instance is a possibility of reverter.
A reversionary interest has been variously defined as "any future
interest left in a transferor or his successor in interest",
2 or "the
residue of an estate left in the grantor, to commence in possession
after the termination of some particular estate granted out of him".'
A possibility of reverter arises from a grant so limited that it may
last forever, or may terminate on a contingency. It is the possibility
1263 Ky. 61, 91 S. W. (2d) 990 (1936).
2 Ten. Restat. Law of Prop., Sec. 199B.
32 Bl. Com. 175; 4 Kent. 354; Frank Fehr Brewing Co. v. Johnston,
97 S. W. 1107, 30 K. L. R. 211 (1906).
